El derecho internacional de los derechos humanos no protege a las personas que desean tener una muerte digna al no reconocer la existencia del derecho a morir, que aún está implícito en los derechos humanos basados en la dignidad. Este artículo explora las cuestiones de la eutanasia y el suicidio asistido tanto en el contexto del derecho internacional de los derechos humanos como de la jurisprudencia. Intenta construir un marco legal internacional de derechos humanos, llamado marco del derecho a morir con dignidad (DTR), encargado de brindar a las personas en condiciones de salud difíciles acceso a prácticas para el final de la vida. El artículo es, por encima de todo, un documento jurídico, cuya tarea es investigar cómo los derechos humanos existentes basados en la dignidad podrían usarse como facilitadores de la legalización. Sin embargo, también se inscribe en el campo de la filosofía del derecho considerando que la normatividad filosófica del marco, así como su reconciliación con la teoría del derecho natural y los argumentos de la santidad de la vida, son cuestiones de interés.

International human rights law fails to protect people who wish to have a dignified death by not recognising the existence of the right to die yet implicit in dignity-based human rights. This paper explores the issues of euthanasia and assisted suicide both in the context of international human rights law and of jurisprudence. It attempts to build an international human rights law framework, called the right to die with dignity (RTD) framework, charged with giving people in distressing health conditions access to end-of-life practices. The paper is a legal paper above all else, tasked with investigating how existing dignity-based human rights could be used as legalisation enablers. However, it also inscribes itself in the field of the philosophy of law considering that the philosophical normativity of the framework as well as its reconciliation with natural law theory and sanctity of life arguments are great matters of interest.

Palabras Clave:
Eutanasia, Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, dignidad, autodeterminación, pendiente resbaladiza.

Keywords:
Euthanasia, European Convention on Human Rights, dignity, self-determination, slippery slope.

índice:

I. INTRODUCTION; II. EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR WHO? AVOIDING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AT THE OUTSET; 1. Adult patients suffering from severe physical pain; A. Adult patients suffering from a terminal/incurable disease; B. Adult paralysed patients; 2. Adult patients suffering from dementia; III. BUILDING A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY FRAMEWORK BASED ON DIGNITY-BASED HUMAN RIGHTS; 1. The foundational right to life: an obvious forum to infer the right to die with dignity; A. Strasbourg’s strict construction of the right to life under article 2 ECHR; B. An international evaluation around the right to life: source of inspiration for the European Court of Human Rights; C. Does the right to die with dignity already exist?; D. The living instrument doctrine: do present day conditions allow for inferring a right to die with dignity?; 2. The right to die with dignity derived from the prohibition against inhuman or degrading treatment; A. Pretty’s unfounded interpretation of article 3 ECHR; B. The linkage between the right to be free from degrading treatment and dignity; 3. The right to die with dignity derived from the right to private life; A. The right to die with dignity derived from the right to self-determination included under the scope of the concept of private life; B. The right to die with dignity derived from the broad meaning of the concept of private life; IV. THEORETICAL INQUIRIES INTO THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY: THE HIDDEN NOTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAPABLE OF NORMATIVELY JUSTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF THE FRAMEWORK; 1. A misplaced Kantian meaning of dignity applied by the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of the right to life; A. Kant’s conception of dignity as wholly intrinsic; B. Montaigne and Dworkin’s conception of dignity as personal; C. The European Court of Human Rights’ Kantian philosophy; 2. Rebutting «sanctity of life» arguments; A. Natural law vs legal positivism – Rebutting religious sanctity of life arguments; B. Rebutting secular sanctity of life arguments; V. CONCLUSION; VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

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